Project Evaluation and Control in Decentralized Firms: Is Capital Rationing Always Optimal?
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Publication:4896427
DOI10.1287/mnsc.41.8.1404zbMath0859.90003OpenAlexW2153562952MaRDI QIDQ4896427
Pradyot K. Sen, Tae-Young Paik
Publication date: 20 October 1996
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.41.8.1404
principal-agent modelcapital rationingrisk neutralityproject evaluationpre-contract private information
Decision theory (91B06) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Hierarchical systems (93A13)
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