Strategyproof mechanism design for facility location games with weighted agents on a line
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Publication:489723
DOI10.1007/s10878-013-9598-8zbMath1312.91056OpenAlexW2060390705MaRDI QIDQ489723
Publication date: 21 January 2015
Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-013-9598-8
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25)
Related Items (14)
Mechanism design for one-facility location game with obnoxious effects on a line ⋮ Strategyproof mechanisms for \(2\)-facility location games with minimax envy ⋮ The obnoxious facility location game with dichotomous preferences ⋮ Minmax for facility location game with optional preference under minimum distance requirement ⋮ Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources ⋮ Two-facility location games with distance requirement ⋮ Constrained heterogeneous two-facility location games with max-variant cost ⋮ Constrained heterogeneous facility location games with max-variant cost ⋮ Facility location games with optional preference ⋮ Mechanism Design for One-Facility Location Game with Obnoxious Effects ⋮ Approximation randomized strategy-proof mechanisms in obnoxious facility game with weighted agents ⋮ Multiple facility location games with envy ratio ⋮ Multiple facility location games with envy ratio ⋮ Two-facility Location Games with Minimum Distance Requirement
Cites Work
- Truth, justice, and cake cutting
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- Mix and match: a strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Facility Location Games with Many Facilities
- Incentives in Teams
- Mechanisms for Obnoxious Facility Game on a Path
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