REWARD VERSUS RISK IN UNCERTAIN INFERENCE: THEOREMS AND SIMULATIONS
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Publication:4899961
DOI10.1017/S1755020312000184zbMath1272.03057OpenAlexW2144681284MaRDI QIDQ4899961
Publication date: 10 January 2013
Published in: The Review of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020312000184
Related Items (4)
Qualitative probabilistic inference under varied entropy levels ⋮ Logic and probability: reasoning in uncertain environments -- introduction to the special issue ⋮ A utility based evaluation of logico-probabilistic systems ⋮ Completeness and correspondence in Chellas-Segerberg semantics
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