THE BENEFIT OF REDUCED COMPETITION AND THE COST OF INFORMATION RENT UNDER OUTSOURCING

DOI10.1111/J.1467-8586.2011.00397.XzbMath1254.91370OpenAlexW1973454961MaRDI QIDQ4899987

Kojun Hamada

Publication date: 10 January 2013

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00397.x

zbMATH Keywords

outsourcingcost uncertaintyinformation rentdifferentiated duopolyin-house production

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

There may be no pass through of a merger-related cost efficiency

Cites Work

• Identification of classes of differential games for which the open loop is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium
• Outsourcing in a Global Economy
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Integration versus Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium

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