FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION

DOI10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00356.xzbMath1254.91230OpenAlexW2111434169MaRDI QIDQ4899994

Shigeo Muto, Shin Kishimoto

Publication date: 10 January 2013

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00356.x

zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargaining solutionfee licensingroyalty licensingCournot duopoly market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (5)

Bargaining over a license: A counterintuitive result ⋮ On the core of a patent licensing game ⋮ Technology licensing strategies for three cost-differential manufacturers ⋮ Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments ⋮ The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology

Cites Work

• The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results
• Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• The Bargaining Problem
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

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