Multi-task agency with unawareness

DOI10.1007/S11238-013-9397-9zbMath1304.91148OpenAlexW3125454880MaRDI QIDQ490055

Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Xiaojian Zhao

Publication date: 21 January 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9397-9

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractsmoral hazardscreeningunawarenessmulti-task agency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Related Items (2)

Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard ⋮ Delegation and information disclosure with unforeseen contingencies

Cites Work

• Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
• Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
• Incomplete contracts and complexity costs
• Extensive games with possibly unaware players
• Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
• Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
• Satisficing Contracts
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Incentives for Unaware Agents
• Costly Contract Contingencies
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents

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