Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat

DOI10.1007/s11238-013-9394-zzbMath1304.91145OpenAlexW2161632220MaRDI QIDQ490057

Esat Doruk Cetemen, Emin Karagözoğlu

Publication date: 21 January 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/12852

zbMATH Keywords

implementationarbitrationultimatum gameequal divisiondivide the dollar gamesubgame perfect Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (7)

Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games ⋮ Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games ⋮ Reasonable Nash demand games ⋮ Ultimatum bargaining with envy under incomplete information ⋮ (In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games ⋮ A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium ⋮ Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash demand game

Cites Work

• A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems
• Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash demand game
• A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
• Two-person bargaining: An experimental test of the Nash axioms
• Divide the dollar: Three solutions and extensions
• Implementation of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
• On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Divide-the-dollar game revisited
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