Stable sets in one-seller assignment games

DOI10.1007/s10479-013-1439-8zbMath1308.91063OpenAlexW2073329208MaRDI QIDQ490208

Dezső Bednay

Publication date: 22 January 2015

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/1322/1/Bednay_OneSellerAssignment.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stable setassignment gamesingle-unit auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites Work

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• Auctioning Böhm-Bawerk's horses
• Assignment games with stable core
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market
• The assignment game. I: The core

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