Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent

DOI10.1073/pnas.1206569109zbMath1264.91010OpenAlexW1976450472WikidataQ34276418 ScholiaQ34276418MaRDI QIDQ4907498

Alexander J. Stewart, Joshua B. Plotkin

Publication date: 2 February 2013

Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1206569109

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (23)

Evolutionary behavior of generalized zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma games under localized extremal dynamics ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game with extortion strategy under win-stay-lose-move rule ⋮ Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games ⋮ What you gotta know to play good in the iterated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ The evolvability of cooperation under local and non-local mutations ⋮ A study of prisoner's dilemma game model with incomplete information ⋮ Zero-determinant strategies in infinitely repeated three-player prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ The robustness of zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of zero-determinant strategies in repeated multiplayer games ⋮ Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions ⋮ Interaction stochasticity may hinder cooperation in the spatial public goods game ⋮ Memory-based prisoner's dilemma game with conditional selection on networks ⋮ Quantization and experimental realization of the Colonel Blotto game ⋮ Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games ⋮ Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Autocratic strategies for alternating games ⋮ Zero-determinant strategies in repeated asymmetric games ⋮ Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Optimal administrative response to selfish behaviors in urban public management: the role of zero-determinant strategies ⋮ Evolving novelty strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma in deceptive tournaments ⋮ Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies ⋮ Promoting cooperation by setting a ceiling payoff for defectors under three-strategy public good games

Cites Work

• An interpretation and proof of the fundamental theorem of natural selection
• The Evolution of Cooperation

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