Group stability in matching with interdependent values

DOI10.1007/S10058-014-0156-3zbMath1329.91101OpenAlexW2120438552MaRDI QIDQ490943

Alessandro Citanna, Michael Ostrovsky, Archishman Chakraborty

Publication date: 21 August 2015

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-014-0156-3

zbMATH Keywords

interdependent valuesgroup stabilitymodified serial dictatorship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (6)

Efficient assignment with interdependent values ⋮ Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values ⋮ Group robust stability in matching markets ⋮ Market Design ⋮ Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners ⋮ Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences

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