Using Signaling Games to Model the Multi-step Attack-Defense Scenarios on Confidentiality

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_7zbMath1284.91093OpenAlexW156401455MaRDI QIDQ4909434

Peng Liu, Jiwu Jing, Jingqiang Lin

Publication date: 13 March 2013

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_7

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryattack graphsignaling gamemulti-step attack-defense scenario

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

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