Cournot vs. Bertrand under relative performance delegation: implications of positive and negative network externalities
From MaRDI portal
Publication:491309
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.02.007zbMath1331.91118OpenAlexW1981392680MaRDI QIDQ491309
Publication date: 24 August 2015
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.02.007
Related Items (11)
Equilibrium further studied for combined system of Cournot and Bertrand: a differential approach ⋮ Network externalities and process R\&D: a Cournot-Bertrand comparison ⋮ Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities ⋮ Downstream rivals' competition, bargaining, and welfare ⋮ Endogenous expectations management with network effects: a note ⋮ PRICE AND QUANTITY COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS IN A MIXED DUOPOLY: A TECHNICAL NOTE ⋮ Vertical product differentiation, managerial delegation and social welfare in a vertically-related market ⋮ Wholesale pricing and evolutionary stable strategies of retailers under network externality ⋮ On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies ⋮ Network compatibility, intensity of competition and process R\&D: a generalization ⋮ Strategic delegation under fulfilled expectations
Cites Work
This page was built for publication: Cournot vs. Bertrand under relative performance delegation: implications of positive and negative network externalities
