OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF TRADABLE EMISSION PERMITS UNDER UPSTREAM–DOWNSTREAM STRATEGIC INTERACTION

DOI10.1142/S0219198912400038zbMath1261.91036MaRDI QIDQ4916139

Joana Resende, Giuseppe De Feo, Maria-Eugenia Sanin

Publication date: 19 April 2013

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

regulationstrategic interactiontradable emission permitsgrandfathering

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: Taxing emissions or trading on permit markets?

Cites Work

• Leader-follower equilibria for electric power and \(\text{NO}_x\) allowances markets

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