Behavior of Collective Cooperation Yielded by Two Update Rules in Social Dilemmas: Combining Fermi and Moran Rules

DOI10.1088/0253-6102/58/3/05zbMath1264.91012OpenAlexW2196686784MaRDI QIDQ4922719

Lei Wang, Juan Wang, JinSong Wang, Cheng-yi Xia

Publication date: 4 June 2013

Published in: Communications in Theoretical Physics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1088/0253-6102/58/3/05

zbMATH Keywords

regular lattice spatial prisoner's dilemma game cooperation promotion spatial snowdrift game Fermi update rule Moran update rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Taxonomy, cladistics, statistics in mathematical biology (92B10) Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22) Decision theory for games (91A35)

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