<em>N</em>-Person Cake-Cutting: There May Be No Perfect Division

DOI10.4169/amer.math.monthly.120.01.035zbMath1266.91011OpenAlexW1832254459WikidataQ58281588 ScholiaQ58281588MaRDI QIDQ4923957

Michael A. Jones, Steven J. Brams, Christian Klamler

Publication date: 28 May 2013

Published in: The American Mathematical Monthly (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.4169/amer.math.monthly.120.01.035

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessefficiencyenvy-freenessequitability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (8)

Toss one's cake, and eat it too: partial divisions can improve social welfare in cake cutting ⋮ Existence of a simple and equitable fair division: a short proof ⋮ Fair cake-cutting for imitative agents ⋮ Two-person cake cutting: the optimal number of cuts ⋮ Fair Division ⋮ Fair allocation of indivisible goods with minimum inequality or minimum envy ⋮ The discrete yet ubiquitous theorems of Carathéodory, Helly, Sperner, Tucker, and Tverberg ⋮ Cake cutting: explicit examples for impossibility results

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