A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players

DOI10.1007/s10479-015-1841-5zbMath1358.91011OpenAlexW3122026289MaRDI QIDQ492793

Yong-Cai Geng, Sumit K. Garg

Publication date: 21 August 2015

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29067/

zbMATH Keywords

game theorybargainingserial ruleveto players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

A dynamic multi-player bargaining game with veto players

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