Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
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Publication:492810
DOI10.1007/s10479-014-1763-7zbMath1358.91049OpenAlexW3022398878MaRDI QIDQ492810
Publication date: 21 August 2015
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-014-1763-7
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