Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.006zbMath1320.91015OpenAlexW834749693MaRDI QIDQ492881

Qianfeng Tang

Publication date: 21 August 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.006

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumgames with incomplete informationhierarchies of beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items

Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information ⋮ Informational robustness of common belief in rationality ⋮ Interim partially correlated rationalizability

Cites Work

• On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information
• Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited
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• Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Signaling and mediation in games with common interests
• Interim partially correlated rationalizability
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• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• Common Priors: A Reply to Gul
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model