Extreme points of the Harsanyi set and the Weber set

DOI10.1016/j.jmaa.2015.06.039zbMath1338.91017OpenAlexW814981260MaRDI QIDQ493794

Jun Su, Theo S. H. Driessen, Hao Sun, Gen-Jiu Xu

Publication date: 4 September 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmaa.2015.06.039

zbMATH Keywords

carrierextreme pointTU gamesWeber setHarsanyi setMoebius transformation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Nonadditive integration and some solutions of cooperative games ⋮ Cooperative games on simplicial complexes ⋮ Procedural interpretation and associated consistency for the Egalitarian Shapley values

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Existence of Edgeworth and competitive equilibria and fuzzy cores in coalition production economies
• Characterizations of the random order values by Harsanyi payoff vectors
• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• A short proof of the inclusion of the core in the Weber set
• A note on a consistency property for permutations
• The Harsanyi set for cooperative TU-game
• 1-concave basis for TU games and the library game
• The selectope for cooperative games
• Consistency for the additive efficient normalization of semivalues
• Associated consistency characterization of two linear values for TU games by matrix approach
• On the Harsanyi payoff vectors and Harsanyi imputations
• Matrix analysis for associated consistency in cooperative game theory
• A new proof for Weber's characterization of the random order values
• Cores of convex games
• Equivalent Representations of Set Functions
• A MATRIX APPROACH TO THE ASSOCIATED CONSISTENCY WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE SHAPLEY VALUE
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game