Efficient cost-sharing mechanisms for prize-collecting problems

DOI10.1007/S10107-014-0781-1zbMath1319.90056OpenAlexW2061835534MaRDI QIDQ494320

R. Ravi, Jochen Könemann, Anupam Gupta, Guido Schäfer, Stefano Leonardi

Publication date: 31 August 2015

Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ir.cwi.nl/pub/22945

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Discrete mathematics in relation to computer science (68R99)

Related Items (2)

Is Shapley cost sharing optimal? ⋮ Cost sharing over combinatorial domains : Complement-free cost functions and beyond

Cites Work

• Equitable cost allocations via primal-dual-type algorithms
• Unnamed Item

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