Coalition formation processes with belief revision among bounded-rational self-interested agents

DOI10.1093/logcom/9.6.793zbMath0963.91003OpenAlexW1987442989MaRDI QIDQ4943499

Tuomas W. Sandholm, Fernando A. Tohmé

Publication date: 27 June 2001

Published in: Journal of Logic and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/233087f95c8c34e7afb0edcfe71bed18764bca10

zbMATH Keywords

games without sidepaymentsstable coalition structureAlpha core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (6)

A Dynamic Solution Concept to Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions ⋮ Managing parallel inquiries in agents' two-sided search ⋮ Coalitions among computationally bounded agents ⋮ Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions ⋮ Optimizing the mutual intelligibility of linguistic agents in a shared world ⋮ Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study

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