Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.06.010zbMath1347.91159OpenAlexW834199794MaRDI QIDQ495653

Richard Steinberg, Victor Naroditskiy

Publication date: 15 September 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62771/

zbMATH Keywords

congestionredistribution mechanismsVCG

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• Destroy to save
• How much can taxes help selfish routing?
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Redistribution of VCG Payments in Public Project Problems

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