Markets, correlation, and regret-matching
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.009zbMath1347.91188OpenAlexW2257280655WikidataQ56936103 ScholiaQ56936103MaRDI QIDQ495654
Andreu Mas-Colell, Sergiu Hart
Publication date: 15 September 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.009
dynamicscorrelated equilibriumWalrasian equilibriumdeterministic regret-matching dynamicsexchange economiesHannan setimplementation of Walrasian equilibriaregret-matchingsocially concave gamessunspot equilibrium
Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (4)
Cites Work
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