Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.07.004zbMath1347.91122OpenAlexW2124717068MaRDI QIDQ495657

Dan Bernhardt, Brett Graham

Publication date: 15 September 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/70518/1/WRAP_Congress_May_4_2015%20%252800000002%2529.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

voting ruleslegislative bargainingagenda settingdelegated decision makingsupermajority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise ⋮ Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations

Cites Work

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• Dynamic legislative policy making
• A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games
• Competence and Ideology
• The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution
• Endogenous Political Institutions
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Voting on Majority Rules

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