Legislative bargaining with teams

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.001zbMath1347.91152OpenAlexW3123739810MaRDI QIDQ495664

Anthony J. Bradfield, John H. Kagel

Publication date: 15 September 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

legislative bargainingteams versus individualstruth wins

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining
• The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
• Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more ``rational players?
• Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
• Learning in a multilateral bargaining experiment
• Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers

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