Incentive compatible market design with applications
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Publication:495753
DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0444-8zbMath1388.91114OpenAlexW2026240790MaRDI QIDQ495753
Publication date: 15 September 2015
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0444-8
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (8)
On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching ⋮ Pricing in position auctions and online advertising ⋮ Balanced ranking mechanisms ⋮ Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values ⋮ Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade ⋮ Balanced implementability of sequencing rules ⋮ The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching ⋮ The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap
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