Strong equilibrium in network congestion games: increasing versus decreasing costs
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Publication:495760
DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0448-4zbMath1388.91069OpenAlexW2134373565MaRDI QIDQ495760
Publication date: 15 September 2015
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0448-4
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Cites Work
- Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
- Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium
- Strong equilibrium in congestion games
- Network structure and strong equilibrium in route selection games.
- Potential games
- Topology of series-parallel networks
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
- The network equilibrium problem in integers
- Topological Conditions for Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Networks
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- Unnamed Item
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