An efficient implementation of the Gale and Shapley “propose-and-reject” algorithm

DOI10.5614/ejgta.2020.8.1.4zbMath1468.05286OpenAlexW3014656240MaRDI QIDQ4957968

Nasia Zacharia, Christos Kaklamanis, Evi Papaioannou

Publication date: 6 September 2021

Published in: Electronic Journal of Graph Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.5614/ejgta.2020.8.1.4

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingefficient implementationpropose-and-reject algorithmgale and Shapley algorithmthe firms/candidates problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Graph algorithms (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C85)

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