Optimal contract design for effort-averse sensors

DOI10.1080/00207179.2018.1486041zbMath1440.91025OpenAlexW2811440035MaRDI QIDQ4960207

Michael Cantoni, Iman Shames, Farhad Farokhi

Publication date: 9 April 2020

Published in: International Journal of Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/285060

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryestimationeffort-averse sensors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Networked control (93B70) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

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• Faithful Implementations of Distributed Algorithms and Control Laws

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