On the Commitment Value and Commitment Optimal Strategies in Bimatrix Games
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Publication:4961342
DOI10.1142/S0219198918400017zbMath1416.91011arXiv1612.08888MaRDI QIDQ4961342
Stefanos Leonardos, Costis Melolidakis
Publication date: 29 October 2018
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.08888
Nash equilibriumbimatrix gamecommitment valuesubgame perfectpure strategy equilibriumcommitment advantageous gamescommitment optimalweakly unilaterally competitive games
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