Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*

DOI10.1093/qje/qjs026zbMath1400.91047OpenAlexW2111571153WikidataQ55892306 ScholiaQ55892306MaRDI QIDQ4962988

Takashi Kunimoto, Drew Fudenberg, Philippe Aghion, Olivier Tercieux, Richard T. Holden

Publication date: 6 November 2018

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1995

zbMATH Keywords

information perturbationsextensive form mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (17)

Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms ⋮ Continuous virtual implementation: complete information ⋮ Efficient investments in the implementation problem ⋮ Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima ⋮ One-step-ahead implementation ⋮ Locally robust contracts for moral hazard ⋮ Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design ⋮ Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty ⋮ Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Full implementation in backward induction ⋮ Hidden action and outcome contractibility: an experimental test of moral hazard theory ⋮ Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs ⋮ Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty ⋮ Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals ⋮ Noncontractible investments and reference points

This page was built for publication: Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*