Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*
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Publication:4962988
DOI10.1093/qje/qjs026zbMath1400.91047OpenAlexW2111571153WikidataQ55892306 ScholiaQ55892306MaRDI QIDQ4962988
Takashi Kunimoto, Drew Fudenberg, Philippe Aghion, Olivier Tercieux, Richard T. Holden
Publication date: 6 November 2018
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1995
Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (17)
Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms ⋮ Continuous virtual implementation: complete information ⋮ Efficient investments in the implementation problem ⋮ Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima ⋮ One-step-ahead implementation ⋮ Locally robust contracts for moral hazard ⋮ Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design ⋮ Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty ⋮ Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Full implementation in backward induction ⋮ Hidden action and outcome contractibility: an experimental test of moral hazard theory ⋮ Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs ⋮ Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty ⋮ Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals ⋮ Noncontractible investments and reference points
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