Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns *

DOI10.1093/QJE/QJU034zbMath1400.91266OpenAlexW2116614761MaRDI QIDQ4963032

Christian Hellwig, Andrew Atkeson, Guillermo Ordoñez

Publication date: 6 November 2018

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w17898.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

general equilibrium modelreputationfirm dynamicsmarket entry taxes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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