Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition *

DOI10.1093/qje/qjv033zbMath1400.91511OpenAlexW198288708MaRDI QIDQ4963062

Pierre C. Boyer, Felix J. Bierbrauer

Publication date: 6 November 2018

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp4814.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

political competitionpublic-goods provisionincome taxationpublicly provided private goodsprivate information of voters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) History, political science (91F10) Public goods (91B18) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (7)

Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities ⋮ Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision ⋮ Borda-optimal taxation of labour income ⋮ Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations ⋮ Modeling large societies: why countable additivity is necessary ⋮ Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions ⋮ Information and targeted spending

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