Rawlsian altruism with perfect discrimination leads to social efficiency

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2015.1118098zbMath1417.91101MaRDI QIDQ4963359

Domenico Menicucci, Pier Luigi Sacco

Publication date: 2 November 2018

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicscooperationcoordinationperfect discriminationRawlsian altruism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Evil green beards: tag recognition can also be used to withhold cooperation in structured populations
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Entitlement and the efficiency-equality trade-off: an experimental study
• A Theory of Status-Mediated Inequity Aversion
• Evolutionary Selection of Socially Sensitive Preferences in Random Matching Environments
• Inequality and Procedural Justice in Social Dilemmas
• Game theory and evolution
• Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
• Fairness Norms Can Explain the Emergence of Specific Cooperation Norms in the Battle of the Prisoner's Dilemma

This page was built for publication: Rawlsian altruism with perfect discrimination leads to social efficiency