Explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma game under incomplete and complete information

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2016.1226301zbMath1417.91081OpenAlexW2521597589MaRDI QIDQ4963371

Jacob Dijkstra, M. A. L. M. van Assen

Publication date: 2 November 2018

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2016.1226301

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationincomplete informationprisoner's dilemmasequential playrepeated play

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Group Extinction in Iterated Two Person Games with Evolved Group-Level Mixed Strategies ⋮ An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma

Cites Work

• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Interactive preferences
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
• A theory of reciprocity
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Social Motives and Expectations in One-Shot Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemmas
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• A Theory of Status-Mediated Inequity Aversion
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation

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