Explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma game under incomplete and complete information
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Publication:4963371
DOI10.1080/0022250X.2016.1226301zbMath1417.91081OpenAlexW2521597589MaRDI QIDQ4963371
Jacob Dijkstra, M. A. L. M. van Assen
Publication date: 2 November 2018
Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2016.1226301
Related Items (2)
Group Extinction in Iterated Two Person Games with Evolved Group-Level Mixed Strategies ⋮ An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma
Cites Work
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Interactive preferences
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- A theory of reciprocity
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Social Motives and Expectations in One-Shot Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemmas
- The Evolution of Cooperation
- A Theory of Status-Mediated Inequity Aversion
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
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