Evolutionary dynamics on measurable strategy spaces: asymmetric games

DOI10.1016/j.jde.2015.07.005zbMath1360.91027OpenAlexW2200039814MaRDI QIDQ496723

Saul Mendoza-Palacios, Onésimo Hernández-Lerma

Publication date: 22 September 2015

Published in: Journal of Differential Equations (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jde.2015.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsevolutionary gamespopulation gamesasymmetric evolutionary gamesordinary differential equations in measure spacesspace of finite signed measures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Nonlinear ordinary differential equations and systems (34A34) Nonlinear differential equations in abstract spaces (34G20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (10)

A survey of static and dynamic potential games ⋮ Dynamics of asymmetric division of labor game with environmental feedback ⋮ Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games ⋮ Stability of the replicator dynamics for games in metric spaces ⋮ Globally Strong Uninvadable Sets of Profiles in Asymmetric Games ⋮ Evolutionary game theory in mixed strategies: from microscopic interactions to kinetic equations ⋮ Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games ⋮ Evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games ⋮ The replicator dynamics for games in metric spaces: finite approximations ⋮ Natural selection between two games with environmental feedback

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