Partnership’s Profit Sharing: Linear and Nonlinear Contracts

DOI10.1142/S0219198919400085zbMath1417.91313OpenAlexW2944145168WikidataQ126032830 ScholiaQ126032830MaRDI QIDQ4968307

Eugene Khmelnitsky, Yigal Gerchak

Publication date: 12 July 2019

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198919400085

zbMATH Keywords

optimal controlrisk-aversioncontractspartnershipsjazz history

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
• A Survey of the Maximum Principles for Optimal Control Problems with State Constraints
• Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
• A Combinatorial, Graph-Based Solution Method for a Class of Continuous-Time Optimal Control Problems
• Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market

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