Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria

DOI10.1142/S0219198919400097zbMath1417.91259MaRDI QIDQ4968308

Gisèle Umbhauer

Publication date: 12 July 2019

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumwar of attritionsecond-price all-pay auctionbest-reply matchingclassroom experiment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching.
• Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Game Theory and Exercises
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information

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