Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria

DOI10.1142/S0219198919400115zbMath1417.91091OpenAlexW3125829808MaRDI QIDQ4968310

Thomas A. Weber

Publication date: 12 July 2019

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198919400115

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfectionfirst-mover advantagesecond-mover advantagepartial commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way
• A continuum of commitment
• The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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