Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring

DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0893-8zbMath1367.91030OpenAlexW784382776MaRDI QIDQ496866

Yuanzhang Xiao, Mihaela van der Schaar, William R. Zame

Publication date: 22 September 2015

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0893-8

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesimperfect public monitoringefficient outcomesperfect public equilibriumrepeated contestrepeated partnershiprepeated resource allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
• Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

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