Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships

DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0895-6zbMath1367.91144OpenAlexW2128261246MaRDI QIDQ496871

Ayça Kaya, Galina Vereshchagina

Publication date: 22 September 2015

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0895-6

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardpartnershipsassortative matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (3)

Sorting expertise ⋮ Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game ⋮ Incentives and the structure of teams

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