Strategic Communication With Minimal Verification

DOI10.3982/ECTA15712zbMath1448.91074OpenAlexW2989692589MaRDI QIDQ4971282

Georgy Egorov, Gabriel D. Carroll

Publication date: 12 October 2020

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15712

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcheap talkmultidimensional informationverifiability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (2)

Communication with partially verifiable information: an experiment ⋮ When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication

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