Strategically Simple Mechanisms

DOI10.3982/ECTA15897zbMath1448.91073arXiv1812.00849OpenAlexW2902303938WikidataQ126652699 ScholiaQ126652699MaRDI QIDQ4971285

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Publication date: 12 October 2020

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.00849

zbMATH Keywords

votingmechanism designbilateral tradefirst-order belieflocal dictatorshipstrategic simplicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Trade models (91B60) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (7)

Correlation-robust auction design ⋮ Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade ⋮ Strategically simple implementation in the bilateral trade problem ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching ⋮ Computational implementation ⋮ Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices ⋮ Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading

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