Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2017.1691zbMath1455.91164OpenAlexW2805113243MaRDI QIDQ4971365

Daniela Saban, Yash Kanoria, Jay Sethuraman

Publication date: 12 October 2020

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1691

zbMATH Keywords

convergencematchingcoretransferable utilitywagesstochastic modeluniqueness of equilibriumassignment markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets

Cites Work

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• Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
• The nonatomic assignment model
• On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment problem
• Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Competitive Equilibria in Two-Sided Matching Markets with General Utility Functions
• Coalitional Bargaining in Networks
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Estimating matching games with transfers
• Large Matching Markets as Two-Sided Demand Systems
• The size of the core in assignment markets
• Probability
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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