Budget Feasible Procurement Auctions

DOI10.1287/opre.2017.1693zbMath1455.91112OpenAlexW2803710485MaRDI QIDQ4971366

Afshin Nikzad, Gagan Goel, Nima Anari

Publication date: 12 October 2020

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/3de05c41343c694783ed19406e18dd73a7908b45

zbMATH Keywords

knapsack problemmechanism designprocurementbudget feasiblerobust auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

Auction mechanisms for allocating subsidies for carbon emissions reduction: an experimental investigation

Cites Work

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• A note on maximizing a submodular set function subject to a knapsack constraint
• Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
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• AdWords and generalized online matching
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Optimal Auction Design
• Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Experimental Design

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