Multilateral Bargaining in Networks: On the Prevalence of Inefficiencies
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Publication:4971558
DOI10.1287/opre.2018.1725zbMath1455.91115OpenAlexW2256734019WikidataQ57832889 ScholiaQ57832889MaRDI QIDQ4971558
Publication date: 12 October 2020
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/206275/files/NDL2015-053.pdf
Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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