Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4973272
DOI10.1142/S0218202519500428zbMath1428.91005arXiv1910.12629OpenAlexW2966555906MaRDI QIDQ4973272
Linjie Liu, Attila Szolnoki, Xiaojie Chen
Publication date: 3 December 2019
Published in: Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.12629
Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22) PDEs in connection with game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences (35Q91)
Related Items (25)
Rewarding endowments lead to a win-win in the evolution of public cooperation and the accumulation of common resources ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in spatial threshold public goods game with the asymmetric return rate mechanism ⋮ Environmental feedback in spatial public goods game ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment ⋮ Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Decentralized incentives for general well-being in networked public goods game ⋮ Stochastically stable equilibria for evolutionary snowdrift games with time costs ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in a conformity-driven evolving dynamic social network ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in \(N\)-person snowdrift games with peer punishment and individual disguise ⋮ Stability analysis of game models with fixed and stochastic delays ⋮ Analysis of dynamic evolution process of the N-player division of labor game model ⋮ The dynamics of corruption under an optional external supervision service ⋮ The impact of labor subsidy, taxation and corruption on individual behavior ⋮ Promoting cooperation by reputation-based payoff transfer mechanism in public goods game ⋮ Based on reputation consistent strategy times promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ From particles to firms: on the kinetic theory of climbing up evolutionary landscapes ⋮ The effects of resource limitation and consensual incentives on cooperation ⋮ Heterogeneous investment with dynamical feedback promotes public cooperation and group success in spatial public goods games ⋮ Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game ⋮ Third party interventions mitigate conflicts on interdependent networks ⋮ On the interaction between soft and hard sciences: the role of mathematical sciences. Looking ahead to research perspectives ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the \(N\)-person stag hunt game ⋮ Synergy and discount of punishment in the public goods game ⋮ Evolutionary Dynamics of Cooperation in a Corrupt Society with Anti-Corruption Control ⋮ Reward and punishment mechanism with weighting enhances cooperation in evolutionary games
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
- Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules
- Diversity of reproduction rate supports cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
- Applications of centre manifold theory
- Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources
- Evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control
- Invasion and expansion of cooperators in lattice populations: prisoner's dilemma vs. snowdrift games
- Promoting cooperation by punishing minority
- Replicator dynamics for public goods game with resource allocation in large populations
- Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma
- Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- Balancedness among competitions for biodiversity in the cyclic structured three species system
- Stochastic evolutionary differential games toward a systems theory of behavioral social dynamics
- EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE UNDER COLLECTIVE-RISK DILEMMAS
- The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
- Modeling behavioral social systems
- MATHEMATICS AND COMPLEXITY IN BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
- Modeling altruism and selfishness in welfare dynamics: The role of nonlinear interactions
- Cooperation, competition, organization: The dynamics of interacting living populations
- Cooperation dynamics of polycentric climate governance
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion
- A quest toward a mathematical theory of the dynamics of swarms
- MATHEMATICS AND COMPLEXITY IN LIFE AND HUMAN SCIENCES
This page was built for publication: Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
