Crime, Intimidation, and Whistleblowing: A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports
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Publication:4973592
DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDY075zbMath1425.91267OpenAlexW2908066688WikidataQ128671816 ScholiaQ128671816MaRDI QIDQ4973592
Sylvain Chassang, Gerard Padró I. Miquel
Publication date: 28 November 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy075
inferencecrimepolicy evaluationplausible deniabilityintimidationstructural experiment designwhistleblowing
Economics of information (91B44) Social and behavioral sciences: general topics (91C99) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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