Reactive learning strategies for iterated games

DOI10.1098/rspa.2018.0819zbMath1427.91056arXiv1903.04443OpenAlexW3104969508WikidataQ90102976 ScholiaQ90102976MaRDI QIDQ4973937

Alex McAvoy, Martin A. Nowak

Publication date: 6 December 2019

Published in: Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.04443

zbMATH Keywords

adaptive strategysocial dilemmaiterated gamememory-one strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

Payoff landscapes and the robustness of selfish optimization in iterated games ⋮ Reactive strategies: an inch of memory, a mile of equilibria

Cites Work

• The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
• Repeated games with one-memory
• Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
• What you gotta know to play good in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• A Stochastic Model with Applications to Learning
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