Reactive learning strategies for iterated games
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Publication:4973937
DOI10.1098/rspa.2018.0819zbMath1427.91056arXiv1903.04443OpenAlexW3104969508WikidataQ90102976 ScholiaQ90102976MaRDI QIDQ4973937
Publication date: 6 December 2019
Published in: Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.04443
Related Items (2)
Payoff landscapes and the robustness of selfish optimization in iterated games ⋮ Reactive strategies: an inch of memory, a mile of equilibria
Cites Work
- The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
- Repeated games with one-memory
- Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
- What you gotta know to play good in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
- A Stochastic Model with Applications to Learning
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