The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules

DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9451-2zbMath1377.91081OpenAlexW1989545121MaRDI QIDQ497471

Issofa Moyouwou, Mathieu Martin, Sébastien Courtin

Publication date: 24 September 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9451-2

zbMATH Keywords

\(q\)-majoritymajority efficiencypositional rules (simple and sequential)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention ⋮ Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency ⋮ Condorcet winners and social acceptability ⋮ Social acceptability of Condorcet committees

Cites Work

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• Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency
• Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
• The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability
• Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition
• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic

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